TVA and the other federal electric utilities were created under Democratic administrations, and their service territories were initially bluer than average. These subsidized enterprises sell cheap power preferentially to non-investorowned distributors, so such utilities are more prominent where the federal utilities are important sellers. The political map of the U.S. has changed dramatically since the federal utilities were created. The federal utilities and non-investorowned distributors are now more important on average in red states than in blue ones. Interest has trumped ideology: Republican policy-makers strongly opposed to socialism in principle seem happy with the important role of government enterprises in the U.S. electric utility industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government's role in the electric power sector began under President Theodore Roosevelt with the passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902. Act of 1906 stated explicitly that electricity generated at those dams that was not needed to power irrigation pumps could be sold, as it evidently already had been, with preference given to municipal utilities. Variants of this "preference clause," extended to cover other non-investorowned utilities, were associated with the subsequent federal power enterprises mentioned * Howard W. Johnson Professor of Management and Economics Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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below. 2 The federal role in the electric power industry initially grew very slowly: in 1932 the federal government had only 2.5% of national hydroelectric capacity. assistance to cooperatives providing electricity in rural areas. 4 In 1935, only about 11% of farms had electricity; by 1940 the number of farms with electricity had increased by 230%. 5 Like the expanded preference clause in the legislation creating the TVA, the exclusion of investor-owned utilities (IOUs) from subsidies for rural electrification seem to have reflected Roosevelt's preference for government enterprises over investor-owned utilities. President Eisenhower seems to have been less adamantly opposed to federal production and sales of electricity than President Hoover had been. In a press conference, he mused regarding TVA, "So we get to this curious thing in the socialistic theory: that we, all of us, provide such cheap power to one region-apparently it is subsidized by taxes from all of us all over the country-but then it can appeal and take away industries from the other sections of the country." While he went on to call for "some kind of reevaluation of all these things," he reminded his audience that: "As I have stated a thousand times, I am not out to destroy TVA." fossil and nuclear facilities, and the federal utilities accounted for 6.6% of the nation's total generating capacity.
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On the surface, this change of partisan roles is curious. As President Eisenhower recognized, the federal electric utilities are subsidized through their ability to raise capital at below-market rates. They can borrow directly from the Federal Government, and TVA and BPA can sell bonds to private investors at favorable rates because the market perceives that their non- The first key to understanding contemporary Republican support for these government enterprises created by Democrats-as well as Democrats' interest in privatizing those same enterprises-is to recognize, as President Eisenhower did, that the federal electric utilities benefit some regions at the expense of others. This pattern is outlined in Section II, where the data used in subsequent quantitative analyses are described. The second key is to recognize that a substantial change in the political geography of the U.S. has taken place since the [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] [1946] [1947] [1948] [1949] [1950] period when all of the federal utilities except the APA were established. As Section III demonstrates, the beneficiaries of this program were bluer than average in this early period but are redder than average today. Contemporary Republican support for socialism in electric power can thus be understood as a simple triumph of interest over ideology. Section II also presents the geographic pattern of the importance of non-investor-owned utilities-municipal utilities, cooperatives, state agencies, and special-purpose entities-in electricity distribution. Section III shows that states where these enterprises are currently important were also somewhat bluer than average in the 1932-1950 period but are redder than average now. Since these local enterprises are not directly subsidized by taxpayers in other parts of the country, it may seem odd that states that became more Republican over this period nonetheless continued to embrace public ownership of distribution utilities -socialism at the retail level. Part of the answer lies in the effects of the "preference clause" that has guided the operation of the federal utilities since 1906, but institutional inertia seems also to have been important. Another part lies in the importance of continuing subsidies to rural electric cooperatives, estimated by the Energy Information Administration to amount to up to $319 million in 2010 alone.
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Section III describes the statistical analysis that supports these assertions, and Section IV provides brief concluding observations.
II. DATA
A. The Federal Utilities
In what follows I use FEDSHR, the ratio of federal utilities' total sales (in megawatt-hours) to total retail sales in each state in recent years as a measure of the contemporary importance of the federal utilities. Most of the federal utilities sales are at the wholesale level, and wholesale sales exceed retail sales by the amount of losses in the distribution system. While these losses will vary from state to state, they amount to only a few percent on average, and variation in them is unlikely to be a major source of measurement error. Each federal utility has a designated service area, and I use FEDANY, a dummy variable equal to one if FEDSHR is positive in a state and equal to zero otherwise, as an indicator of the presence of the federal utilities. While the costs of subsidizing the federal utilities are borne by all taxpayers, 16 states receive absolutely no benefits, and 18 others receive few benefits, though some communities within the latter states might have a lot to lose if their federal utility supplier were privatized.
The nine darkly shaded states in Figure 1 receive substantial net benefits. These programs thus have concentrated benefits and relatively diffuse costs, so that privatization would have diffuse benefits and concentrated costs. 
B. Non-Investor-Owned Distributors
Our measure of the importance of non-investor-owned distribution utilities, NONIOU, is simply 100 minus the percentage share of investor-owned utilities in total retail sales in 2010. 31 Figure   2 exhibits the geographic pattern of NONIOU. As in Figure 1, Comparing Figure 3 with Figures 1 and 2 shows the strongest similarities in the South, particularly in the area served by TVA, and in the Northeast. 
C. Independent Variables

III. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
A. The Federal Utilities
The first two columns of Table 2 report probit estimates using early-period variables that attempt to explain the geographic scope of the federal utilities. 41 The results in the first column seem consistent with a public interest model in which the federal utilities were primarily an income transfer vehicle, with service territories covering relatively poor states, regardless of their hydro potential. However, the second column shows that early-period partisan preference has more explanatory power. Relative income is no longer close to significant, hydro potential remains insignificant, and the best predictor of whether or not a state was selected for service by a federal electric utility is how blue it was during the Roosevelt-Truman years.
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The third and fourth columns report tobit estimates using early-period variables that attempt to explain the importance of the federal utilities. 43 In both columns, HYDRO is highly significant. As noted above, this is probably to some extent an artifact, since the federal utilities accounted for over 40% of total hydroelectric capacity in 2010. The results in column 3, like those in column 1, suggest an income transfer role for the federal utilities, but RPI1950 falls from significance when DVEARLY is added to the equation reported in column 4, and DVEARLY is nearly significant at the 10% level. While the results in these first four columns are hardly definitive, they do not provide much support for a pure public interest theory of either federal utilities' service territories or their importance within them. They provide more support for a model in which states that leaned Democratic were rewarded with federally subsidized electricity.
The last two columns in Table 2 examine the relation between the coverage and importance of the federal utilities and late-period relative income and partisan preference 41 In all cases in Table 2 , logit and probit results were qualitatively equivalent. 42 The correlation between DVEARLY and RPI1950 is -0.58; blue states tended to be poorer than average. 43 Because of the large number of zero observations of FEDSHR, it is appropriate to estimate a censored regression model, for which tobit is the standard estimation method, rather than using least squares.
variables. Column 5 indicates that the more Republican a state was in 2010, the more likely it was to be served by a federal utility. 44 As in column 2, neither HYDRO or relative per-capita personal income added significant explanatory power. In column 6, like column 4, the coefficient of HYDRO is positive and highly significant, but the coefficient of the Democratic share of the Presidential vote, DVLATE, is now negative and significant at the 6% level. In short, it appears that the federal electric utilities were established and developed, at least in part, to benefit states that tended to vote Democratic. As those states became much less blue over time, and institutional inertia maintained the scope of the federal utilities, red states became the beneficiaries of these government enterprises. And Republicans, particularly from those states that directly benefitted from the federal utilities, became their defenders. Democrats, ideologically more favorable to government enterprise than Republicans but increasingly representing states that paid for the subsidies to the red states served by the federal utilities, became advocates of privatization. Not surprisingly, and not atypically, interests trumped ideology. Table 4 presents regressions attempting to explain variations in NONIOU, the share of noninvestor-owned distribution utilities in states' total retail sales. Following the pattern of Table 2 , the first two columns use early-period independent variables, and the final two columns use lateperiod variables.
B. Non-Investor-Owned Distributors
The results in the first column are consistent with a model in which the decisions at the state and local level regarding public versus private enterprise in electricity distribution are driven by economic interest: non-investor-owned distributors are more important where the federal utilities are more important, so there is more opportunity to acquire power at belowmarket rates, and in states with a larger fraction of the population in rural areas, which are thus better positioned to benefit from federal subsidies for rural electrification. Adding relative income in 1950 (on the grounds that lower-income voters might be more eager for federal subsidies), an interaction term between FEDSHR and RU1950 (on the grounds that subsidies for rural electrification are more attractive the greater the opportunity to buy cheap power from federal utilities), or the square of FEDSHR (on the grounds that if the local federal utility accounts for a very large share of generation, investor-owned utilities can also buy preference power) did not improve the explanatory power of this equation. There is no support in the column 1 estimates for the notion that Democratic-leaning voters were more likely to favor public enterprise at the state and local level. The third and fourth columns of Table 4 show the results of using late-period values of the rural share of the population and the Democratic share of the Presidential vote. It is interesting that the early-period quantities have (slightly) greater explanatory power. Adding the Nebraska dummy variable in the fourth column increases the explanatory power of the equation in the third column substantially and decreases the coefficient of DVLATE, which nonetheless remains significant at the 5% level.
It is surprising that the contemporaneous rural share has no explanatory power in either column 3 or column 4. Even if the geographic scope of rural cooperatives in each state was largely fixed in the early 1950s, one would have thought that the fraction of the population in rural areas in 2010 would affect the coop share of retail sales and thus the total non-IOU share.
While the first two columns in Table 4 provide at best weak evidence that early-period blue states were more likely to rely on non-IOU distribution, the last two columns provide strong evidence that late-period red states are more likely to do so-both because, as Table 2 shows, FEDSHR remains strongly negatively related to DVLATE and because, somewhat surprisingly, DVLATE has a significant negative coefficient even in the presence of FEDSHR.
45 Table 5 shows that, as above, at least part of the explanation for these results is the change in the political map between early and late periods, combined with institutional inertia. Table 5 shows that the 20 states in which IOUs dominated retail sales in 2010 were more Republican than average in the early period but more Democratic than average in the later period. Thirteen of them became bluer, with the Democratic share increasing by more than 10 percentage points in four. On the other hand, the 28 that made heavier use of non-IOU distributors were bluer than average in the early period but became redder than average in the late period. Nineteen of these states became redder, and in 11 of these the Democratic share of votes for President fell by more than 10 percentage points. It is thus not that red states have come to dis-favor IOUs; it is rather that states that relied heavily on non-investor-owned 45 The correlation between DVEARLY and NIOU is 0.24, and the correlation between DVLATE and NIOU is -0.41. It is not implausible that the fact that more rural states tended to be bluer in the early period increased the Roosevelt administration's enthusiasm for subsidizing rural electrification: the correlation between DVEARLY and RU1950 is 0.33. The ensuing change in the political map has reversed this relationship: the correlation between DVLATE and RU2010 is -0.33.
distributors in the 1950s, many of them blue states, continued to do so in 2010 even as on average they became redder. As at the national level, interest has trumped ideology. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The federal electric utilities and their service territories were largely defined by the Democratic administrations of Roosevelt and Truman. The higher a state's Democratic vote share in the 1932 and 1952 Presidential elections, the more likely it was to be served by a federal utility and thus to benefit from the subsidies that utility received. The more important hydroelectric generation is in a state within any federal utility's service territory, the greater that utility's share of total sales in that state.
Because the federal utilities sell their subsidized power preferentially to municipal utilities, rural cooperatives (themselves the recipients of federal subsidies) and other noninvestor-owned public enterprises, the more important the federal utilities are in any state, the greater the incentive to rely on non-IOU electricity distributors. And, empirically, the more important are the federal utilities in any state, the more important are non-IOU distributors.
Between the early 1932-1950 period and a more recent period around 2010, the political map of the United States shifted dramatically; the correlation between the Democratic shares of votes for President in the two periods is -0.37. The scope of the federal utilities underwent no such dramatic shift, however. States not served by the federal utilities-and thus contributing to their subsidies-were redder than average in the early period and bluer than average recently, while the reverse held for the states that benefitted from those subsidies.
At the state and local level, distribution utility ownership patterns established in part in response to the incentives provided by federal programs seem also to have remained relatively stable despite dramatic changes in the political map. As a consequence, by 2010 the more
